Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (Routledge Studies in Epistemology)

Introductory Note Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford Part I: The Nature of Epistemic Duty 1 Epistemic Duty, Justified Belief, and Voluntary Control Matthias Steup 2 Believing Badly: Doxastic Duties are not Epistemic Duties Miriam Schleifer McCormick 3 Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity Luis Oliveira 4 Epistemic Tension and Epistemic Duty: A Rossian Account Mark T. Nelson 5 Intellectual Responsibility and the Scope of the Will Robert Audi 6 We Are Like American Robins Ema Sullivan-Bissett Part II: Epistemic Duties of Individuals 7 Bound by the Evidence Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain 8 Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias Lindsay Rettler and Bradley Rettler 9 Robust Justification Jonathan Matheson 10 Ought to Believe vs. Ought to Reflect Anthony Robert Booth 11 Wisdom, Open-Mindedness, and Epistemic Duty Sharon Ryan 12 On What We Should Believe (And When (and Why) We Should Believe What We Know We Should Not Believe) Clayton Littlejohn 13 The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought Anne Meylan Part III: Social Epistemic Duties 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief Rik Peels 15 Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief Rebecca Wallbank and Andrew Reisner 16 When the Personal Becomes Political: How Do We Fulfil Our Epistemic Duties Relative to the Use of Autobiographical Stories in Public Debates? Lisa Bortolotti and Sophie Stammers 17 Dialectical Responsibility and Regress Skepticism Scott Aikin 18 Epistemic Duties Regarding Others Jennifer Lackey